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Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of 
conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in 
essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or 
judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian 
experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the 
complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for 
the  complementary  models  of  settlements,  the  first  oriented  mainly  to  increasing  the  likelihood  of 
detection,  and  the  second  oriented  to  saving  social  costs  of  litigation.  Second,  the  concern  with  the 
preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of 
settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value 
to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse 
effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.  
  
 







There is not much controversy that settlements are an important part of a 
policy of cartel deterrence (Hammond, 2006a; Connor, 2007). Some authors emphasize 
the  win-win  feature  of  negotiated  procedures  to  abbreviate  the  administrative  and 
judicial disputes related to cartel prosecution as opposed to fully adversarial procedures 
(Landes,  1971;  Scott  and  Stuntz,  1992;  Wils,  2008).  This  almost  consensus
1  in  the 
literature  is  absolutely  expected,  provided  that  parties  are  rational  and  do  not  have 
                                                 
* To be published in Zach, R; Heinemann, A.; Kellerhals, A. The Development of Competition Law: 
Global Perspectives. 1
st ed. London : Edgard Elgar, 2010. 
1 Although the literature is quite convergent about the potential benefits of settlements, there is a dissent 
regarding some actual results, mainly related to the punishment innocent defendants. About these critics, 
see Schulhofer (1992) and Bar-Gill and Gazal-Ayal (2006).   2 
significant cognition problems. Inasmuch as litigation costs may be avoided and the 
fully adversarial procedure is always an alternative to the settlement, parties must be at 
least better off if they opt to settle a case. 
More relevant and with important policy implications is the discussion 
about the appropriate design of this type of contract, particularly because it is not a 
trivial solution given the information asymmetry between the competition authority and 
defendants,  and  the  complex  interaction  among  settlements  and  other  investigative 
mechanisms,  such  as  leniency  agreements.  This  paper  addresses  this  issue  both 
theoretically, by means of a simple game theoretical model, and empirically, by means 
of the Brazilian experience. 
A  quite  straightforward  model  explores  the  relationship  among  three 
alternatives available to cartel participants: pursuing the trial, engaging in a leniency 
agreement,  or  settling  the  case.  The  model  leaves  out  the  well-know  problem  of 
asymmetric information about risk preferences (Grossman and Katz, 1983; Reinganum, 
1988), focusing on the private information, unknown to the competition authority, about 
the costs of the admission of guilt and of pursuing the trial (i.e., the benefits of finality). 
As a traditional result in the contract theory with asymmetric information, a menu of 
contracts that separates the various types of defendants is the recommended solution. 
When it is difficult to design a mechanism that is able to separate the various types, the 
competition authority may opt to ration the access to the settlement (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). 
The  Brazilian  experience  with  settlements,  although  very  recent,  is 
particularly  interesting  because  the  amendment  in  the  Brazilian  Competition  Law 
allowing settlements in cartel cases delegated to the Competition Authority (CADE) 
great  discretion  in  the  design  of  such  agreements.  As  a  consequence,  the  Brazilian 
experience  allows  to  analyse  different  models  of  settlements  and  the  complex 
interaction between settlements and leniency agreements. 
This article is organized as follows. First, it describes the historical and 
institutional  background  in  order  to  provide  the  foundations  for  understanding  the 
Brazilian  case.  Next,  based  on  the  international  experience,  it  provides  the  basic 
principles  for  the  design  of  settlements  in  cartel  cases.  As  a  core  section,  we  then 
theoretically discuss two polar models for settlements (2nd Leniency agreement and   3 
pre-judicial settlements) and the controversial issues of pleading guilty and the amount 
to be paid by applicants for settlement. Lastly, we draw some lessons from the recent 
Brazilian experience with settlements. As a main finding, we claim that there is leeway 
for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the 
likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. 
 
2. Cartel deterrence in Brazil 
 
The  Brazilian  program  for  cartel  deterrence  experienced  a  substantial 
change in the first decade of 2000. This change has strict connection with the discussion 
regarding the convenience of the use of settlement agreements in cartel cases. Up to the 
1990s,  the  vast  majority  of  successful  conduct  cases  prosecuted  by  the  Brazilian 
Competition Policy System (SBDC
2) were trivial to detect
3. Cartel cases were rare and 
generally resulted from complaints or evidence brought from outside the SBDC usually 
by independent public prosecutors. These cases have the common characteristic of not 
requiring  substantial  investigative  effort  of  the  SBDC,  because  the  complaints  were 
often accompanied by evidence or the required evidence could be obtained from public 
sources  such  as  public  registrars  or  notaries.  In  short,  the  ability  of  the  SBDC  to 
investigate cartels was still to be developed. 
The change began with the amendment of the Competition Law in 2000 
by means of Law No. 10.149/2000, which allowed the SBDC to enter into lenience 
agreement  with  whistleblowers.  The  same  amendment  prevented  the  mechanism  of 
settlements  in  cartel  cases,  aiming  at  providing  more  powerful  incentives  for  cartel 
participants  to  engage  in  the  lenience  program,  which  was  the  single  instrument  of 
agreement  between  the  SBDC  and  a  member  of  a  cartel.  This  was  important  to 
introduce the new institute as a concrete and attractive alternative for possible cartel’s 
whistleblowers  and,  more  importantly,  to  grant  to  the  competition  authority  a 
fundamental instrument for detecting and punishing cartels (Brenner, 2005). 
                                                 
2 Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência 
3 According to information compiled by CADE, 73% of CADE’s convictions were imposed to medical 
cooperatives. Although such kind of cases are still common in the first decade of 2000, there was a clear 
diversification of the profile of convictions, particularly the increase of cartel cases.   4 
The legal change was not yet sufficient to induce the use of this type of 
investigative  instrument  for  cartel  deterrence.  Competition  Law  was  not  yet  a  self-
enforcing institution
4, as there was not yet the general belief about punishment for cartel 
participants.  Without  expectations  regarding  the  likelihood  and  the  severity  of  the 
punishment,  cartel  participants  did  not  have  incentives  to  ask  for  full  immunity  as 
beneficiaries of a leniency agreement. This is probably the main reason why the first 
lenience agreement was concluded only in 2003, three years after its legal provision in 
the Brazilian Competition Law.  
Equally or more important than the change in the legal framework has 
been the fostering of expertise and adoption of more appropriate mechanisms for the 
detection of cartels, such as wiretapping and, in particular, dawn raids. This change 
started  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  decade  of  2000,  but  has  been  intensified 
considerably in its second half. According to the Secretary of Economic Law (SDE), 
between 2003 and 2005, only 11 search warrants had been granted. In 2006, 19 warrants 
were granted. In 2007, once again the number of warrants exceeded the accumulated 
throughout SBDC’s history, reaching 84 warrants granted and accomplished
5. 
Concomitantly, with the purpose of preservation of evidence, two orders 
of temporary arrest were granted between 2003 and 2005. This instrument was used 
with stronger intensity in 2007, when SDE, in partnership with the Public Attorney’s 
Office, obtained, just in this year, 30 warrants of temporary arrest
6. 
The  use  of  new  investigative  mechanisms,  such  as  dawn  raids  and 
wiretapping, increased the likelihood of cartel  detection, and, as  a consequence, the 
demand for leniency agreements, which also had an additional effect on the probability 
of the disclosure of a cartel. Within the next four years as of 2003 approximately ten 
                                                 
4 The concept of self-enforcing institution is drawn from Greif (2006), who defines institutions as “a 
system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior”. 
The Competition Policy is an institution that has rules (Competition Law), beliefs (expectations that the 
unlawful behavior  will be punished), norms (e.g. procedures to apply  for a leniency agreement) and 
organizations (e.g. the competition authority). An institution is self-enforcing if “each individual, taking 
the structure as given, finds it best to follow the institutionalized behavior that, in turn, reproduces the 
institution in the  sense that the implied behavior confirms the associated beliefs and  regenerates the 
associated norms”, that is to say, that the institution is “effective in generating a particular behavior”. 
5 In 2008, from January to September, the number of search warrants was 54, close to the figures of 2007 
for the same nine months. 
6 In 2008, from January to September, the number of temporary arrest increased to 32, denoting a more 
intense use of this type of instrument to allow collecting evidence on collusive behavior.   5 
agreements  were  signed,  including  several  which  revealed  antitrust  violations  yet 
unknown by the SBDC. 
With  the  use  of  such  investigative  instruments,  a  more  intense  action 
against  cartels  was  possible,  including  the  selection  of  cases  of  greater  economic 
relevance and which have higher probability of conviction, allowing a more efficient 
use  of  investigation  resources.  As  SDE  summarizes  in  its  annual  report,  "the 
investigative  operations  took  place  in  sectors  of  great  relevance  to  the  economy, 
including  alleged  domestic  cartels,  such  as  the  ones  involving  cement  and  gasoline 
stations,  as  well  as  alleged  international  cartels  investigated  simultaneously  within 
several jurisdictions, such as the ones involving marine hoses and air freight."
7 
Lenience  agreements  and  the  new  investigative  mechanisms  caused  a 
significant change not only in the profile of cases brought to  administrative trial  at 
CADE but also on the strength of evidence supporting the cases. Until 2003, cartels 
cases were based on indirect evidence and price parallelism. The discussion within the 
administrative proceedings focused on whether there was or was not a violation to the 
law. The denial of the existence of the conduct used to be the main content of the 
defendants’ defense before CADE as well as of the appeals filed before the judiciary. In 
such cases, the role of the judiciary focused on reviewing the CADE's decision after the 
conclusion of the administrative proceedings  and as of the issuance of a conviction 
decision.  The  judiciary  used  to  review  mainly  aspects  related  to  due  processes  and 
defendants’ rights. 
In contrast, in a context of direct evidence, which grows in relevance due 
to the lenience agreement and the new investigative instruments, the defense focuses on 
the legality or validity of each of the direct evidence, reserving a secondary role to the 
question of whether a violation to the law existed. In this new stage of the Brazilian 
program of combat to cartels, defendants access the judiciary predominantly while the 
administrative proceeding is still in progress, increasing the costs of litigation. Such 
resources, in the event of termination of the dispute, could be more efficiently used in 
new investigations and, thus, in the deterrence of violations to antitrust law. 
The increasing costs of litigation with defendants fostered the demand for 
a  negotiated  procedure  to  end  cartel  cases.  Settlements  are  pareto-efficient  if  they 
                                                 
7  DPDE/SDE/MJ annual report, 2007, page 21.   6 
eliminate the costs of litigation while maintaining or enhancing the dissuasive effect of 
the enforcement of the competition law. As a consequence, settlements are an important 
mechanism in a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the success in detection 
is sufficient to generate relevant cartel cases and, hence, the effort of defendants to fully 
contest the entire administrative procedure. Next section exposes the main aspects of 
settlements in cartel cases, exploring its features as a contract between the competition 
authority and defendants. 
 
3. Settlement as a contract 
 
The settlement is a contract between the authority and individuals and 
companies accused of antitrust offenses, for instance engaging in a cartel. The main 
items of this contract are the waiver of rights or the waiver of the exercise of such 
rights. The ability to practice such disposal act has been granted by the competition law 
in the case of the authority and, regarding the defendant, belongs to his/her sphere of 
waiver powers. 
As  to  the  defendant,  the  waiver  of  rights  may  take  various  forms.  It 
essentially takes the form of obligations of not acting which are usually accompanied by 
other  types  of  obligations  such  as  collateral  ones.  Brazilian  law  provides  for  some 
mandatory  content  in  cartel  settlements.  Obligations  other  than  those  depend  upon 
mutual agreement between the parties. The mandatory provisions of a cartel settlement 
are: (i) obligation to cease the unlawful conduct, (ii) setting a fine in cases of breach of 
the  agreement,  and  (iii)  the  obligation  to  pay  a  pecuniary  sanction
8.  Examples  of 
provisions  which  depend  upon  the  negotiation  between  the  parties  are:  (i) 
implementation of a compliance program by means of which the defendant is obliged to 
adopt  internal  procedures  to  prevent  further  violations  to  the  antitrust  law,  (ii)  the 
obligation to cooperate with the investigation in progress within the SBDC by means of 
the  production  of  additional  evidence
9,  (iii)  admission  of  guilt,  which  has  relevant 
                                                 
8 The amount paid as a fine is granted to the Federal Fund of Diffuse Rights (FDD), which is then 
allocated to projects oriented to the benefit of general diffuse rights, such as environment conservation, 
cultural and history preservation, and consumer protection. 
9 This obligation may be split into sub-items, which allows setting various formats thereto. These sub-
items may be the obligation to grant access to information and documents to the antitrust authority, or 
obligations such as instructing employees to provide information or documents.   7 
implications to the credibility of the commitment to cease the dispute
10, and (iv) waiver 
of  procedural  rights,  such  as  to  continue  litigating,  both  within  the  administrative 
proceeding and the judiciary
11. 
The  competition  authority,  in  its  turn,  interrupts  the  administrative 
proceeding and, once the obligations therein are duly accomplished, closes the case. 
Furthermore, depending on the terms of the agreement, the amount that would be due 
upon conviction for violation of the competition law may be reduced. 
 
4. International experience  
 
Settlements  in  Brazil
12  share  several  features  with  other  negotiated 
mechanisms to finish litigation, which are applied in other jurisdictions, in that the U.S. 
plea  bargaining  is  one  of  the  most  prominent.  There  is  considerable  international 
experience regarding these mechanisms to terminate judicial or administrative disputes. 
In  order  to  provide  some  empirical  foundations  for  the  design  of  settlements,  this 
section summarizes the main aspects of the international experience in using these types 
of agreement between the competition authority and participants of alleged cartels. 
First, it is necessary to acknowledge that the legal framework providing 
for  settlement  agreements  is  embedded  in  the  institutional  environment  of  each 
jurisdiction,  which  varies  significantly  among  countries  (North,  1990;  2005).  The 
institutional environments may vary in many  aspects such as the functioning of the 
judiciary,  the  costs  and  benefits  to  litigate,  and  the  possibility  of  negotiating 
administrative  and  criminal  penalties  in  a  single  settlement.  Thus,  other  jurisdiction 
experiences should always be examined taking into account these differences, which, 
generally, prevent the mere emulation of international practices to a particular country. 
                                                 
10 By pleading guilty, the defendant shall incur in higher costs to re-start the litigation, because his/her 
chances of success become lower once his/her involvement in the offense is admitted. Therefore, this 
fosters a credible commitment as to the end of the dispute  with the antitrust authority, either in the 
administrative proceeding or within the judiciary. 
11 Specifically, this obligation may take the form of recognition of the legality and withdraw of contests 
of the search performed by the authority within defendant’s facilities in order to gather evidence of the 
offense. The contests against searches performed by the authority usually block the use of such evidence 
within both the administrative and criminal spheres. Because all cartel members are usually prosecuted in 
a single administrative proceeding, such contests may block the progress of the proceeding as well as the 
overall prosecution of the members of such cartel. 
12 The settlement in Brazil is denominated Termo de Compromisso de Cessação, as disposed in the art. 53 
of the Brazilian Competition Law (Lei 8.884/94).   8 
Two recent studies prepared, respectively, by the OECD and the ICN
13, 
compiled the practice and opinions of various antitrust authorities with regard to the 
form  and  desirability  of  settlements  in  cartel  cases.  These  studies  show  that  legal 
boundaries  and  usage  of  these  agreements  are  quite  different  among  jurisdictions. 
According to ICN, within 20 surveyed jurisdictions, the legal statutes of only 9 of them 
allow antitrust agencies to enter into settlements in cartel cases
14. The authorities who 
have more  experience in the use of the instrument are the  United States, Germany, 
France and Canada. 
The main differences are the following: 
 
i) Requirements to enter into the agreement.  
Some jurisdictions require a plea of guilty and the commitment to active 
cooperate in the prosecution of others cartel members, such as the United States and 
Canada
15. Others, like South Africa and France, do not make such requirements. Those 
countries allow the conclusion of agreements without explicit admission of participation 
in the offense, but the party shall not contest charged violations
16. 
 
                                                 
13 OECD, 2008; ICN, 2008. 
14 The antitrust authorities in South Korea, Hungary and Sweden are studying the adoption of settlement 
instruments in cartel cases. The antitrust division of the European Commission have just introduced this 
mechanism but as yet without any concluded settlement. 
15 The regulations of the European Commission go in this same direction, restricting the bargaining 
possibilities of the defendants. In this sense, the European Commission clarifies that the regulations shall 
not allow negotiation regarding the existence of the violation or the sanction to be applied. 
16 The study published by the OECD (2008) discusses the possible strategies that may be adopted by 
antitrust authorities, and their consequences when the admission of guilt is required at the discretion of 
the  authority.  In  their  words,  “while  in  certain  jurisdictions  such  as  the  United  States  a  negotiated 
settlement will always include a defendant’s admission of guilt that could be used as evidence in private 
follow-on  litigation,  in  certain  other  jurisdictions  the  competition  authority  or  prosecutor  might  not 
invariably insist on a guilty plea. In these jurisdictions, where the guilty plea is ‘on the negotiating table’, 
defendants are likely to resist a demand to plead guilty if they are concerned about the effects of a plea in 
follow-up civil litigation. Presumably, where the competition authority agrees to settle without a guilty 
plea, it can extract a higher fine. But that case might be the worst outcome for private litigants because 
they will end up without a formal decision finding liability and without a settlement admitting liability. 
That outcome might deprive at least some private litigants of the only realistic opportunity to bring an 
action against cartel members at reasonable costs. Without the evidence from a competition authority 
decision based on a settlement with guilty plea, they might find it too burdensome and risky to establish a 
full case in civil litigation. Conversely, if the competition authority insists on a guilty plea, it may have to 
lower the fine it can obtain in a settlement. Which solution a competition authority prefers should ideally 
be determined by the goal of maximizing overall deterrence. A lower fine in a plea agreement as a price 
to ‘buy’ a guilty plea might be justified if the guilty plea makes civil litigation more likely and litigation 
can lead to fines that exceed the discount granted in the plea agreement.”   9 
ii) Evaluation of the cooperation offered by the defendant.  
The  evaluation  of  the  cooperation  obviously  varies  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  difference  fundamentally  regards  the  degree  of 
predictability that each jurisdiction provides for the mechanism
17. In general, greater 
predictability as to the adopted criteria implies a smaller range of cooperation valuing
18. 
In this regard, the most notable difference is in the models used in the U.S. and in the 
European Union (EU). While in the former the agreement is essentially a mechanism for 
obtaining evidence and reducing the costs of identifying perpetrators, in the EU, the 
agreements  can  only  be  executed  after  the  completion  of  the  investigation,  and, 
therefore,  their  key  role  is  to  reduce  the  costs  of  defense  of  the  antitrust  authority 
decisions  in  the  judiciary.  Issues  such  as  the  valuation  of  the  contribution  to  the 
investigations  (Hammond,  2006b)  are,  therefore,  irrelevant  according  to  the  method 
used by the EU. In part, such distinction may stem from the admissibility of lenience 
agreements with more than one defendant in the EU, in opposition to the U.S., where, 
like in Brazil, only the first-in applicant may qualify for the agreement. 
 
iii) Assessment of the relationship between settlement and the leniency program.  
Some authorities - notably in those of countries of Common Law, where 
negotiated procedures are more usual - believe that settlement and lenience agreements 
are  integrated  policies.  Nevertheless,  both  surveys  of  ICN  and  OECD  note  that 
                                                 
17 In order to provide greater predictability regarding the expected value of the cooperation with the 
authorities, the US Department of Justice, through speeches of its Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mr. 
Scott D. Hammond, reports that the following factors largely determine the value of that cooperation, 
taking in consideration the experience in the previous cases: (i) the cooperation must be provided at a 
time when investigation is benefited, (ii) the importance of the cooperation and its value to significantly 
advance the investigation, and (iii) whether the company is able to bring additional evidence of collusive 
behavior in other markets, thus qualifying for the "Amnesty Plus" program. Regarding the importance of 
the last factor, Mr. Hammond emphasizes that a large number of investigations were initiated because of 
evidence brought under the "Amnesty Plus" program. 
18 Generally, the jurisdictions have adopted more flexible criteria, which involve greater discretion in 
setting  the  conditions  of  the  agreement.  Regarding  a  possible  trade-off  between  transparency  and 
predictability about the terms of the plea bargaining, Hammond (2006b) states that “if the Division [DOJ] 
were  to  establish  an  absolute,  fixed  discount  for  second-ins  without  consideration  of  these  types  of 
variables  [cooperation,  etc.],  then  the  need  for  proportionality  would  be  sacrificed  for  increased 
transparency. Proportional treatment also often requires consideration of factors shared only with the 
sentencing court and not the public, factors such as the state of the investigation at the time of the 
cooperation, the nature and extent to which the cooperation advanced the investigation, and whether the 
cooperation earned Amnesty Plus credit for disclosing undetected cartel offenses. The Division carefully 
weighs all of these variables in measuring the value of a company’s cooperation to ensure proportional 
treatment of cooperating parties across all Division matters”.   10 
settlements may undermine the demand for lenience agreements; therefore, they might 
be conflicting policies.
19 This complex interaction between lenience agreements and 
settlements are the main subject of the theoretical analysis presented in the next section. 
 
iv) Differences concerning the tradable rights. 
According  to  each  legal  system,  some  rights  may  not  be  waived  or 
granted, which reduces the scope of the agreement and prevents some arrangements that 
could be of mutual interest for the parties. For instance, the legal literature regarding 
plea  bargaining  sometimes  express  the  concern  about  the  fact  that  such  agreements 
might undermine the right to defense or subvert the justice within punitive system. This 
would  happen  if  an  innocent  pleads  guilt  in  order  to  avoid  a  more  severe  penalty 
(Schulhofer, 1992; Bjerk, 2007). 
There seems to be some consensus points, which are briefly summarized 
as follows: 
1. Settlements may be an efficient way to successfully terminate cartels 
cases,  promoting  a  better  allocation  of  investigative  and  processing  resources  and 
increasing the detection and punishment of offenses to antitrust law
20. Such agreements 
may also provide certain benefits to defendants which are socially desirable, such as 
saving litigation costs and reducing the uncertainty about the punishment. The reduction 
of uncertainty is beneficial both for the defendant  since it reduces his/her degree of 
exposure to a unknown penalty - as well as to society - because spending substantial 
resources and extensive prosecution do not always result in an appropriate punishment. 
2. A reputation of consistency and fair negotiation may be important for 
effectiveness  of  a  settlement.  Uncertainty  and  asymmetric  information  about  the 
negotiation process may be undesirable for both parties
21. Similarly, there seems to be 
                                                 
19 The OECD emphasizes that if the antitrust authorities can obtain substantial punishment by means of a 
negotiated instrument, in theory, negative effects upon the demand for leniency should not exist. (OECD, 
2008: 9). 
20 Such agreements may maximize the deterrence effect by promoting better use of existing resources. 
Thus, even if the agreement involves a slight reduction in punishment of the defendant, the saving of 
public  resources  could  be  used  to  detect  and  process  new  offenders,  thereby  enhancing  overall 
punishment and deterrence. 
21 In this sense, the OECD recommends that “Negotiated settlements will work best if the competition 
authority can establish a public record of its settlement practice and a reputation of being transparent, 
consistent and fair in settlement negotiations. Publishing negotiated settlements, guidelines, and public 
speeches can contribute to these goals.” (OECD, 2008: 9).   11 
consensus that an antitrust authority may only conclude an agreement if it has sufficient 
information about the relevant facts of the case. 
3.  A  concern  of  most  jurisdictions  regards  to  possible  effects  that 
negotiated  agreements  may  have  in  reducing  punishment  and  thus  undermine  the 
enforcement  of  antitrust  law.  In  this  regard,  a  history  of  credible  threats  based  on 
substantial punishment imposed in previous cases may decrease or even eliminate the 








Roughly speaking, actual or potential defendants in a cartel case have 
three options: (i) application for a lenience agreement, (ii) application for a settlement, 
and  (iii)  pursuing  the  trial,  being  subject  to  possible  conviction  for  violation  of 
competition law. As a consequence, the design of a settlement has possible effects not 
only on the continuity of litigation, but also on the demand for lenience agreements, one 
of the main instruments for detecting cartels. 
The interaction between these instruments has important implications on 
the controversial issues of admission of guilt and the amount to be paid as a pecuniary 
sanction. In this session, these and other issues are explored in more detail in order to 
ground the analysis of the Brazilian experience. 
The analysis of defendant’s decision comprehends the identification of 
costs and benefits in each possible option. Such options may have great variability and 
complexity. They may be affected by characteristics of the defendants themselves, the 
businesses affected by the unlawful conduct, and the cartel’s modus operandi. For sake 
of clarity, this section will present a simple model of defendants’ choice, which points 
out the main principles relevant to the design of a settlement. Therefore, the section 
                                                 
22 The OECD recommends that negotiated instruments for termination of cartel cases should be used with 
caution in jurisdictions in which the program of combat to cartels is still developing and the threat of 
future sanctions have some degree of uncertainty due to the lack of confirmation of sanctions imposed in 
previous cases by the judiciary.   12 
begins with a discussion of the goals pursued by the antitrust authority. Such goals shall 
be the basis for the evaluation of the most appropriate design of a settlement. Then, the 
choice model is presented, emphasizing items such as the need of admission of guilt, 
commitment to cooperate with the investigation, and the level of the pecuniary sanction. 
 
5.2. Authority’s and defendants’ goals in a settlement 
 
In  order  to  assess  the  convenience  of  a  settlement,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider the goals each party pursues within such contract. As usual in Economics, it is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  a  defendant  chooses  the  alternative  (e.g.  entering  into  a 
settlement  vis-à-vis  pursuing  the  trial)  which  offers  the  greatest  return,  taking  into 
account the expected fine at the end of the trial, pecuniary sanction in the settlement, 
collateral obligations, litigation costs and his/her degree of risk aversion. 
In  its  turn,  the  goal  of  the  antitrust  authority  is  the  enforcement  of 
competition  law  as  provided  for  in  most  of  the  jurisdictions  legal  statutes.  What  is 
generally  understood  as  enforcement  of  the  competition  law  is  the  ability  of  the 
authority to prevent and guide individuals’ and companies’ behavior, more specifically, 
to  prevent  anticompetitive  behavior  and  mergers  which  may  harm  the  consumer  or 
social welfare by means of anticompetitive actions (Farrel and Katz, 2006). Therefore, 
agreements between defendants and the authority must be signed if, and only if, they 
enhance the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior. 
Negotiated  mechanisms  between  the  competition  authority  and 
defendants, the lenience agreement included, affect the effectiveness of the competition 
policy in two ways. First, the agreement may exchange punishment for cooperation with 
the authorities. On the one hand, the punishment of a cartel member who cooperates 
with  the  authority  is  reduced.  Ceteris  paribus,  this  under-punishment  mitigates  the 
deterrence effect of the policy. On the other hand, the cooperation with the authorities 
offered in exchange will raise the likelihood of detection of illegal conducts, which is 
especially  relevant  in  cartel  cases  since  this  practice  is  undoubtedly  known  to  be 
unlawful, and, as a consequence, the offenders often try to hide any evidence of such 
behavior, making it more difficult for the authority to build the case.   13 
The second way whereby a contract between the competition authority 
and  defendants  may  affect  the  enforcement  of  the  competition  policy  is  reducing 
litigation  costs.  Eliminating  costs  regarding  investigation,  advocacy  and  legal 
representation  saves  time,  as  well  as  financial  and  human  resources,  which  ceteris 
paribus  leads  to  greater  efficiency  of  the  competition  policy.  The  enforcement  of 
competition  policy  being  more  efficient,  the  authority  may,  with  the  same  budget, 
increase  the  deterrence  of  anticompetitive  behavior.  The  economic  literature  also 
defines as additional benefits derived from settlements (i) the reduction in risks, since it 
was not possible to precisely anticipate the authority’s decision, only to be known as of 
the administrative trial, and (ii) the screening mechanism which may help to distinguish 
guilty from innocent defendants (Grossman and Katz, 1983). 
The analysis of the appropriate design of a settlement shall consider the 
increase effect in the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior and possible undesirable 
effects related to inadequate punishment of the agreement applicants, whether punishing 
innocents  or  under-punishing  perpetrators.  The  interaction  between  these  effects  is 
detailed below, using a simple model of the defendants’ choice. 
 
5.3. A simple model for defendant choice  
 
The  defendant  faces  the  three  basic  alternatives  already  mentioned: 
leniency agreement, settlement, and trial. The timing of this decision is variable and its 
outcome  may  depend  on  actions  of  other  defendants  in  a  cartel  case  (Baker  and 
Mezzetti, 2001; Perloff et al., 1996). For example, if a defendant engages in a lenience 
agreement, this alternative will not be available to any other defendant. In addition, the 
applicant for a lenience agreement is eligible for full immunity only if the competition 
authority  has  not  yet  opened  investigations  against  that  particular  cartel.  Similar 
incentives for early application are provided for in CADE’s Resolution No. 46/2007 
regarding  settlements.  Such  resolution  explicitly  determines  that  the  timing  of  the 
settlement proposal be taken into account for evaluation of the amount of the discount 
that the applicant is eligible. The presentation that follows aims to isolate in a simple 
model the alternatives available to the defendants. Therefore, it deliberately ignores two   14 
aspects of defendants’ decision process: the timing of the decision and the strategic 
interaction among defendants. 
Cartel deterrence is based on three main instruments: (i) administrative 
sanctions,  especially  the  imposition  of  fines  and  collateral  obligations,  (ii)  criminal 
sanctions, and (iii) compensatory private suits by those who were directly damaged by 
the cartel. These instruments may be set by a single judicial body, as is the case of the 
U.S.,  or  by  different  bodies,  as  is  the  case  of  Brazil  and  France.  In  the  latter,  the 
decision  about  an  administrative  sanction  or  settlement,  taken  by  an  administrative 
tribunal, may have unknown consequences on the likelihood of the decisions in other 
areas, inasmuch as the information about the conviction in the administrative tribunal 
may affect the decision in the other judicial bodies. In our model, we allow for these 
indirect effects and take the single judicial body as a special case.  
In  addition  to  these  burdens  related  to  cartel  deterrence,  the 
administrative proceeding results in costs related to defense, representation, and loss of 
reputation,  which  does  not  distinguish  guilty  from  innocent  defendants.  As  a 
consequence, those costs do not play the role of inhibiting the unlawful behavior, as 
they do not provide different pay-offs related to different conducts. These costs incurred 
by both guilty and innocent are net social costs, even if privately incurred
23. 
In our model, these privately incurred costs related to the development of 
the administrative proceedings are separated into two groups: dissuasive punishment, 
which gathers the administrative sanctions and possible changes in the likelihood of 
conviction in criminal and civil areas, and other costs of pursuing litigation up to the 
administrative  trial.  These  costs  are  respectively  represented  herein  by  XT  and  CT, 
where the subscript ‘t’ is mnemonic for ‘trial’
24. 
The lenience agreement, in turn, may or may not involve costs of cash 
disbursement,  according  to  the  timing  of  its  application,  and  provides  for  criminal 
immunity. In contrast, there are costs related to the admission of guilt and the effective 
cooperation with the investigation, which may vary significantly among defendants of a 
                                                 
23  In  addition  to  these  social  costs  incurred  privately  by  guilty  and  innocent  defendants,  the  dispute 
between the authority and defendants involves direct costs to the authority itself and the judiciary, the 
latter used in the arbitration of the dispute. 
24 These values correspond to the certainty equivalent of the yet unknown trial outcome, taking into 
account the defendants risk aversion and the discount rate. The certainty equivalent is the value whose 
utility is equivalent to the expected utility associated to an uncertain outcome (e.g. a lottery).   15 
cartel case. Such costs may result both from changes in the likelihood of success of 
claims for civil damages as well as from retaliation by cartel members. For the sake of 
comparison between the lenience agreement and the settlement, these costs are divided 
into two: XL, which corresponds to pecuniary sanction and other obligations included in 
the  agreement,  and  YL,  which  corresponds  to  the  costs  of  pleading  guilty  and  the 
effective  cooperation  with  the  authorities,  where  the  subscript  ‘L’  is  mnemonic  for 
‘leniency’. 
Finally, the settlement implies costs of cash disbursement and collateral 
obligations, represented herein by XS, and, as the lenience agreement, costs related to 
pleading guilty and effective cooperation with the authorities, represented herein by YS, 
where the subscript ‘S’ stands for ‘settlement’. YS can be zero if the settlement does not 
include  the  admission  of  guilt  and  obligations  of  effective  cooperation  with  the 
authorities.  Some  relevant  aspects  to  the  decision  of  the  parties,  such  as  if  the 
transaction  encompasses  both  criminal  and  administrative  spheres,  are  ignored  at 
present, but they will be taken into consideration later when the details regarding the 
principles that should govern the design of settlements are explored. 
The defendant’s decision problem may be represented in Figure 1, which 
links each alternative to its costs. 
 
Figure 1: A simple model of defendant’s choice 
 
 
The  competition  authority  has  all  the  bargaining  power  to  define  the 
administrative sanctions, including the cash disbursement and collateral obligations, as 
Defendant 
(XL + YL) 
(XS + YS) 
(XT + CT) 
Leniency 
Settlement 
Trial   16 
well  as  to  determine  the  need  of  admission  of  guilt  and  cooperation  with  the 
investigation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  competition  authority  does  not  know  the 
magnitude  of  the  costs  related  to  the  admission  of  guilt  and  cooperation  with 
investigation (YS and YL), and the costs of carrying on with the trial (CT). In addition, 
the authority does not know if defendants are guilty or innocent. Even in possession of 
sufficient  evidence  to  file  administrative  proceedings  against  the  defendants  and  of 
additional evidence gathered during the investigation of a case, it is not possible to 
conclude at the time of the settlement (i.e. before the administrative trial and closing of 
the case in the administrative sphere) if defendants are guilty.  
Since the authority does not have complete information regarding such 
variables,  there  is  the  risk  that  the  design  of  the  agreement  may  under-punish 
perpetrators (i.e. XS + YS < XT) or punish innocent (i.e. XS + YS < CT), which are both 
undesirable from a social perspective. As it is relatively consensual in economic and 
legal  literature,  agreements  such  as  the  settlement  should  be  designed  to  avoid  the 
under-punishment of guilty defendants as well as the punishment of innocent ones. This 
can be done, even if imperfectly, by raising the cash disbursement (XS) to an amount 
sufficiently high to dispel the interest of innocent defendants in seeking a settlement
25. 
The information asymmetry regarding the costs of admission of guilt and 
cooperation with the investigation may also limit the ability of the authority to design 
agreements  which  might  reduce  administrative  costs,  and,  therefore,  increase  the 
enforcement of the competition policy. On the one hand, the requirement of admission 
of  guilt  is  desirable  in  order  to  potentially  increase  the  deterrence  effect  of  the 
administrative sanction, in particular because it undermines trust among cartel members, 
which is an important component of the enforcement of informal contracts (Lazaric and 
Lorenz,  1998).  On  the  other  hand,  costs  of  pleading  guilty  usually  vary  among 
defendants, especially in hard-core cartels, whose mechanisms of punishing defection 
often go beyond purely economic retaliation. Such costs may be higher than those of a 
conviction, as suggested by the fact that there is not lenience agreement in several hard-
core  cartels.  In  other  words,  in  such  cases,  even  the  greatest  of  prizes  –  i.e.,  full 
immunity to criminal and administrative sanctions  is not enough to attract potential 
applicants  for  lenience  agreements.  When  this  occurs,  any  agreement  between  the 
                                                 
25 This is the main conclusion reached by Grossman and Katz (1983) and further by Bjerk (2007).   17 
authority and defendants that requires admission of guilt, either settlement or lenience 
agreements, is, in the defendant’s perspective, worse than carrying on with the trial, and, 
therefore, unfeasible. 
The  differences  in  costs  of  pleading  guilty  define  two  groups  among 
those who participate in a cartel. A first  group  gathers the potential applicants to a 
lenience agreement and is characterized costs of pleading guilty and cooperating with 
the investigations that are not too high so that (XL + YL) < (XT + CT). In other words, 
the  lenience  agreement  is  preferable  to  the  risk  of  prosecution  by  means  of  an 
administrative proceeding  and possible conviction. The second  group includes those 
whose  costs  of  pleading  guilty  and  cooperating  with  the  investigations  (YL)  is 
sufficiently high so that (XL + YL) > (XT + CT). Inasmuch as there are several cartel 
cases which go to administrative trial without lenience agreements, this second group is 
probably fairly large. 
As to the request for a settlement, there are two possible scenarios. If the 
proceeding  has  already  a  lenience  agreement,  then  the  costs  of  pleading  guilty  and 
collaborating with investigations is not so high [i.e., (XL + YL) < (XT + CT)], which 
means  that  this  case  fits  in  the  first  group.  Thus,  even  assuming  that  the  costs  of 
pleading guilty and cooperating with the investigation is different among the members 
of a same cartel, it is reasonable to assume, as a general rule, that requiring a plea of 
guilt in those cases will not dissuade potential applicants for settlement
26. Moreover, 
there is no need to discuss possible negative effects on the leniency program since the 
lenience  agreement  was  already  executed.  In  this  case,  the  settlement  shall  require 
admission of guilt and the obligation to cooperate with the investigation, as CADE’s 
Resolution No. 46 appropriately provides for. 
If  the  administrative  proceeding  has  not  benefited  from  a  lenience 
agreement, there are two cases. First, the costs of pleading guilty and collaborating with 
investigation are comparatively lower [i.e., (XL + YL) < (XT + CT)], which means that 
there  are  potential  applicants  to  a  lenience  agreement.  Second,  those  costs  are 
sufficiently high [i.e., (XL + YL) > (XT + CT)] so that a lenience agreement will not be 
reached, even if a settlement is not an available. The abundant evidence about cartel 
prosecutions  without  leniency  agreements  before  settlements  were  allowed,  in  mid 
                                                 
26 This conclusion does not necessarily apply to cases where individuals are parties in lenience agreement 
due to their limited liability, which reduces the costs of civil damages they may be obliged to pay.   18 
2007, suggests that this second case is empirically relevant, perhaps more likely than the 
first. Furthermore, there are relatively few cases of lenience agreements executed after 
the beginning of an administrative proceeding, even at the time settlements in cartel 
cases were prevented, suggesting that the likelihood of potential applicants for lenience 
agreement is much lower in cases in which the administrative proceeding is already in 
progress. 
In such cases, offering a single contract schema to the defendants
27 – e.g., 
requiring the admission of guilt and collaboration with investigation in all cases – would 
clearly under-use settlements, and, thus, prevent saving litigation costs. As part of the 
defendants may present high costs of pleading guilty [i.e., (XL + YL) > (XT + CT)], such 
requirement would eliminate the possibility of settlement by members of that group.  
This single contract schema for settlements, in which only the value of 
the collaboration with investigation is variable, is, in essence, the practice in U.S., the 
jurisdiction that most intensely uses negotiated proceedings to finish cartel cases. This 
practice implies that settlements in situations where (XL + YL) > (XT + CT) - i.e., when 
no  lenience  agreement  would  be  feasible  regardless  the  possibility  of  settlement  - 
would be discarded prima facie. Additionally, since the lenience agreement provides for 
the maximum punishment reduction (i.e., XL < XS), a settlement with admission of guilt 
would never be signed in cases in which no lenience agreement is reached. As a result, 
this practice reduces the settlement to a second lenience agreement, which is exactly the 
role of plea bargaining in U.S. jurisdiction. 
There  are  three  plausible  explanations  for  why  the  U.S.  model  of 
settlements is widely used, despite the obligation of pleading guilty. First, the costs of 
admission of guilt are probably much lower in the U.S. due to the fact that all possible 
sanctions to cartel participants are decided by a single judicial body. As a consequence, 
a settlement does not generate spillovers or unintended consequences to other areas, 
such as criminal prosecution. Second, the litigation costs for the authority are probably 
lower in the U.S. since the conviction is not subjected to judicial review as it is the case 
of ordinary administrative decisions. Inasmuch as litigation costs are lower, the benefits 
resulting from abbreviating the trial and giving finality are relatively lower. Third, as 
                                                 
27 This strategy is also known in the Economics of Contracts as ‘pooling’.   19 
suggested by Scott and Stuntz (1992), the pecuniary discounts may be so attractive that 
some innocent defendants opt to plead guilty. 
For  the  general  case,  requiring  admission  of  guilt  for  all  cartel 
proceedings implies underutilization of the settlement. The question that remains to be 
answered is whether one can design different contracts for the group that has potential 
interest to negotiate the admission of guilt and collaboration with investigation [i.e., (XL 
+ YL < XT + CT)] and for the group whose costs of pleading guilty are high enough to 
exclude them as potential applicants to the lenience agreement [i.e., (XL + YL > XT + 
CT)]. 
For those who are in the first group - i.e., who want to negotiate a plea of 
guilt and the cooperation with the investigation) - just offering a slightly less favorable 
agreement than the leniency agreement would make the defendants prefer the latter. 
Since the demand for leniency agreements remains unaltered, there is no adverse effect 
on  the  likelihood  of  cartel  detection.  Moreover,  all  the  potential  applicants  for 
settlements that have a low cost of pleading guilty will probably be willing to settle as a 
2
nd leniency, thereby decreasing litigation costs and bringing about new evidence about 
the same or other antitrust offences. 
For  those  who  do  not  intend  to  negotiate  the  admission  of  guilt  and 
collaboration  with  investigations,  the  authority  can  offer  a  contract  in  which  the 
pecuniary  sanction  is  equivalent  to  the  present  value  of  the  punishment  that  the 
defendant  would  receive  by  the  time  of  the  conviction  in  the  administrative  trial, 
discounted by an amount just enough to induce the defendant to settle [i.e., XS = (XT + 
CT - ε)]. In this case, the settlement is featured as a pre-judicial agreement, since the 
reference  for  the  agreement  is  the  administrative  decision,  which  could,  in  turn,  be 
reviewed in the judiciary. 
It is important to note that the authority does not know who the potential 
applicants  for  the  lenience  agreement  are.  Therefore,  these  potential  applicants  may 
apply for a settlement without a plea of guilt, which, if accepted, would reduce the 
ability  to  identify  new  cartels,  and,  hence,  decrease  deterrence.  Therefore,  the 
settlements without a plea of guilt should be sufficiently unattractive to the group who 
has relatively lower costs of admitting guilt.   20 
Due  to  this  interaction  between  the  settlements  and  the  demand  for 
lenience agreements, the size of the discounts offered to induce the defendants to sign 
the agreement (ε)
28 should be carefully analyzed for an optimal design of a settlement 
without  pleading  guilty.  The  greater  the  discount,  the  greater  the  likelihood  of  the 
execution  of  a  settlement,  and  the  greater  the  benefits  from  the  interruption  of  the 
dispute  in  terms  of  resource  saving.  This  saving  of  resources  allows  deepening  the 
investigation, both in the cartel case in which the settlement was executed as well as in 
other cartel cases, and enhances the enforcement of the antitrust policy as a whole. On 
the other hand, if the discount is excessive, it may happen that potential applicants for 
the lenience agreement will prefer the settlement without admitting guilt, which would 
occur if ε > (XT + CT)  (XL + YL). As a result, the ideal size of discount (ε) is defined by 
this trade-off, in which rising (ε) increases deterrence by reducing inefficiency due to 
litigation (finality of the proceedings) and reduces deterrence directly by decreasing the 
punishment and, indirectly, by reducing the demand for the lenience agreement. 
It is worth mentioning that the requirement of admission of guilt for all 
settlements only maximizes the enforcement of the antitrust law if the benefits arising 
from the interruption of the administrative proceedings are negligible in comparison to 
the costs arising from the possible reduction in the demand for lenience agreements. As 
mentioned in Section 2, the costs of litigation are particularly relevant at this stage of 
the Brazilian program of cartel deterrence, so that the benefits of a negotiated 
mechanism are significant. 
In addition to saving litigation costs, even with no admission of guilt, the 
settlement brings finality and as a consequence mitigates the risks associated to the final 
outcome. Given that defendants are likely risk averse, they are better off paying the 
expected value of their probable fines for certain (Grossman and Katz, 1983). It is 
expected that the defendants that are most likely to apply for a settlement, with or 
                                                 
28 If the authority had complete knowledge of all variables and there was common knowledge about their 
values, a discount equivalent to one monetary unit would be sufficient to motivate the execution of a 
settlement without any loss of demand for the lenience agreement. As the authority does not know the 
defendants’ reservation value, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of concluding a settlement 
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without admission of guilt and full collaboration with investigation, are those with a 
higher cost of carrying on with the trial, or, alternatively, those for whom finality is 
more valuable [i.e., CT is significantly high]. 
In short, the flexibility of the settlement allows the negotiation of two 
models of agreements that may enhance the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior: a) 
an agreement requiring the admission of guilt and full collaboration with investigation, 
taking the form of a second lenience agreement; and b) an agreement which, although it 
does not require the admission of guilt, involves the payment of the expected value of 
the punishment on the part of the applicant, taking the form of a pre-judicial settlement. 
 
6. The Brazilian experience with settlements: some preliminary conclusions 
 
Within the first year since the amendment in the Brazilian Competition 
Law allowing settlements in cartel cases, several companies and few individuals applied 
for settling their cases. The variety of proposals by defendants in different industries 
and cartel cases permit to draw some lessons from the Brazilian experience. 
The number of  applicants was substantial for a first  year, particularly 
taking into account the experience with the introduction of the leniency  program in 
Brazil, which took three years to conclude the first agreement. Although substantial, the 
number of proposals is still much lower than the number of potential applicants. Within 
the  first  year,  sixteen  companies,  three  trade  associations  and  ten  individuals  (all 
managers) applied for a settlement, whereas the number of defendants currently being 
prosecuted  in  cartel  cases,  considering  only  cases  of  hard-core  cartels  with  direct 
evidence obtained by dawn raids or communication interception, exceeds 200
29.  
More  remarkable  is  the  rate  of  rejection  of  settlement  proposals  by 
CADE.  The  competition  authority  has  approved  four  out  of  sixteen  settlements 
proposals presented by companies in cartel cases so far: JBS/SA (slaughterhouse soft 
cartel), Lafarge Brasil SA (alleged cement cartel), Alcan Embalagens do Brasil (alleged 
aluminum bags cartel) and Bridgestone Corporation (alleged marine hoses cartel). Three 
                                                 
29 These are cases with a very high probability of conviction as a trial outcome. The number of defendants 
in  all  cartel  cases  probably  exceeds  one  thousand.  Among  the  actual  applicants  for  settlements,  the 
majority is from those cases with direct evidence, but there are also some proposals from soft cartels.   22 
individuals that applied for settlements, all of whom were managers of those companies, 
also had their proposal accepted: two from JBS/SA and one from Alcan. 
Five of the rejected proposals are related to cases that have at least one 
proposal accepted - the alleged cartel of cement industry and that of aluminum bags - 
which is evidence that there is, indeed, significant variability in the costs and benefits of 
settling a case within the same industry. In those cases, not only the applicants offered a 
settlement sum considered insufficient to deter collusion, but also they did not offer any 
effective  collaboration  with the investigations.  The remaining rejected  proposals, all 
from  the  security  guard  services  cartel,  were  set  forth  on  the  day  of  CADE’s  final 
decision,  in  that  they  were  rejected  for  not  meeting  some  requirements  of  CADE’s 
Resolution No. 46/2007 and for being requested too late. 
Regarding  the  model  of  settlement,  as  described  in  the  theoretical 
discussion, three out of four settlements with companies did not require the admission 
of guilt and full collaboration with investigation (pre-judicial model), whereas just one 
proposal,  in  a  case  that  had  benefited  from  a  leniency  agreement,  followed  the  2
nd 
leniency  model.  It  is  noteworthy  that  no  settlement  with  individuals  included  the 
admission  of  guilt,  which  may  be  due  to  the  higher  cost  of  pleading  guilty  when 
criminal prosecution is investigated by a different judicial body, as is the case of Brazil. 
The  chart  below  shows  the  timing,  requirements,  amounts  paid  and 
existence of leniency agreement.  
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Table 1: Settlements concluded in Brazil 
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The  comparison  between  accepted  and  rejected  proposals  shows  a 
remarkable  regularity.  In  all  accepted  proposals  the  applicant  valued  significantly 
finality [i.e., CT was significantly high]. JBS, for instance, was planning an IPO that 
could be adversely affected by its antitrust uncertainty. A similar situation led Alcan to 
apply  for  a  settlement,  as  it  was  about  to  sell  the  business  unit  that  was  under 
investigation,  and  was  willing  to  clear  it  for  sale.  Finally,  Lafarge  and  Bridgestone 
applied  for  settlements  in  Brazil  as  a  result  of  the  company  transnational  policy,   24 
probably  related  to  their  application  for  settlements  in  other  jurisdictions.  Pleading 
guilty  or  committing  to  collateral  obligations  in  one  jurisdiction  may  have  adverse 
spillovers on the prosecution of a cartel in other jurisdictions, particularly in the case of 
international cartels. That is probably why part of the demand for settlements in Brazil, 
similar to the experience with leniency agreements, is from multinational companies 
that are settling simultaneously in several countries. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the current settlement policy has any 
adverse effect on the demand for leniency agreements. On the contrary, as stated in the 
Brazilian submission to OECD, Working Party No 3, 2008, “there is a growing number 
of candidates to the [leniency] program, including members of international cartels”. 
This  positive  result  may  be  due  to  the  rationing  of  settlements,  which  are  actually 
designed for guilty defendants with a higher reservation value for finality. Expanding 
the settlements for a larger group of applicants, by means of a higher discount on the 
expected fine, may have the adverse effect of  attracting innocent defendants with a 
higher value for finality and/or those who would be otherwise candidates for leniency 
agreements. In short, although the Brazilian experience with direct settlements in cartel 
cases  is  still  incipient,  it  shows  that  the  leniency  and  settlement  agreements,  when 
properly designed, are complementary mechanisms in a program of cartel deterrence. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Settlements  are  an  important  part  of  a  program  of  cartel  deterrence, 
particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This 
type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully 
adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and 
to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. 
The  Brazilian  experience  provides  some  insights  about  the  different 
models  of  direct  settlement  in  cartel  cases  and  the  complex  interaction  among 
settlements,  leniency  agreements,  and  trial  outcome.  Brazil  has  experienced  a 
substantial  change  in  cartel  prosecution  since  2000.  The  use  of  new  investigative 
instruments, such as dawn raids, communication interception, and the leniency program,   25 
caused a significant increase in the likelihood of cartel detection, bringing about cases 
of major economic relevance, in sectors such as the cement industry, chemicals, among 
others. As an unintended consequence, the costs of litigation increased substantially, 
fostering the demand for a mechanism of settlement, launched in 2007.  
Within the first year of the settlement program several proposals from 
different industries and cartel cases were submitted, allowing the identification of some 
patterns of the current policy. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of 
settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the 
second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. The two models are designed to 
separate those defendants that have lower costs of admitting guilt and collaborating with 
investigations  from  those  with  higher  costs,  particularly  managers  that  may  still  be 
subjected to criminal prosecution by a different judicial body. Second, the concern with 
the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to 
restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are 
likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the 
current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, 
while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases. The more intense use 
of  this  type  of  negotiated  procedure  shall  be  made  with  caution.  On  the  one  hand, 
greater discounts for settlements increase efficiency but, on the other hand, decrease the 
dissuasive effect of direct sanctions, and the likelihood of detection of new cartel cases 
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